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Effects of “In-Your-Face” Television Discourse on Perceptions
of a Legitimate Opposition
DIANA C. MUTZ University of Pennsylvania
How do Americans acquire the impression that their political foes have some understandable basisfor their views, and thus represent a legitimate opposition? How do they come to believe thatreasonable people may disagree on any given political controversy? Given that few people talk
regularly to those of opposing perspectives, some theorize that mass media, and television in particular,
serve as an important source of exposure to the rationales for oppositional views. A series of experi-
mental studies suggests that television does, indeed, have the capacity to encourage greater awareness of
oppositional perspectives. However, common characteristics of televised political discourse—–incivility
and close-up camera perspectives—–cause audiences to view oppositional perspectives as less legitimate
than they would have otherwise. I discuss the broader implications of these findings for assessments of
the impact of television on the political process, and for the perspective that televised political discourse
provides on oppositional political views.
“Do we truly believe that ALL red-state residents are ig-
norant racist fascist knuckle-dragging NASCAR-obsessed
cousin-marrying road-kill-eating tobacco-juice-dribbling
gun-fondling religious fanatic rednecks; or that ALL blue-
state residents are godless unpatriotic pierced-nose Volvo-
driving France-loving left-wing Communist latte-sucking
tofu-chomping holistic-wacko neurotic vegan weenie
perverts?”
—–Dave Barry, December 18, 2004
Conflict is central to democracy. The legitimacyof democratic outcomes requires that politicaloptions be contested. And yet it also rests on the
premise that each side in any given controversy
perceives the opposition as having some reasonable
foundation for its positions. When citizens end up on
the losing side in any given contest, whether of policy
positions or of candidates, ideally they should perceive
the opposition as having some basis for its positions,
however mistaken, shortsighted, or benighted that per-
spective might seem.
Given that few people speak directly to political ad-
vocates of opposing views, how do Americans come to
perceive that reasonable people may disagree on any
given political controversy? Some theorize that mass
media, and television in particular, serve this purpose
most regularly in the United States (Calhoun 1988;
Page 1996). Political discourse that reaches citizens
through television is widely believed to be the major
means by which citizens learn the rationales for oppos-
ing perspectives. The central questions motivating this
study are: (1) Does televised political discourse famil-
iarize viewers with rationales for oppositional political
perspectives? and (2) If so, does it thereby enhance the
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extent to which oppositional views are perceived as
legitimate? Secondarily, this study also sheds light on a
broader, more intransigent question that has plagued
the study of media and politics since the advent of tele-
vision: What difference does it make that most of what
people experience of public discourse in the political
world reaches them through television?
This study focuses on the implications of televised
political discourse for how citizens feel about the
“other side,” that is, the candidate or policy position
that is not their preferred option. Although this out-
come is far less studied than how citizens form political
preferences, it is arguably of equal importance to the
stability of a political system. Without the acquiescence
of those on the losing side, democratic government
could not continue peaceably. And without some de-
gree of respect for oppositional views, it is doubtful
that the losers in any given contest would tolerate the
winners for long. Some might argue that it is respect
for the process, not for oppositional perspectives, that
compels those on the losing side to continue, but a pro-
cess that produces outcomes that seem totally without
justification is unlikely to persist.
Because of the strong traditional focus in election
research on explaining preferences, empirical studies
of people’s attitudes toward the opposition are limited
(for an exception, see Anderson et al. 2005). However,
as scholars have become increasingly concerned over
the last decade about potential polarization within the
American electorate, more attention has been focused
on how much citizens despise the opposition, as well as
how much they like their own candidate or party. At
present, there is far more consensus on the existence
of polarization among political elites than among the
mass public (e.g., Nivola and Brady 2006). Nonetheless,
some evidence is suggestive of declining respect for op-
positional views. For example, at least since the Eisen-
hower administration, the gap between Republican
and Democratic citizens’ approval of the president has
never been as wide as it has become under George W.
Bush (Jacobson 2007). Until recently, the partisan dif-
ference in approval ratings had never exceeded 70%;
since 2004, such large gaps between perceptions of
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opposing partisans have become commonplace. Feel-
ing thermometer ratings also show a pattern of in-
creased differences between individuals’ feelings to-
ward conservatives and liberals (Fiorina 1999; Jacobson
2000). Based on open-ended questions, Hetherington
(2001) likewise reports that more Americans now have
positive things to say about one party and negative
things to say about the other.
Many scholars have blamed mass media, and tele-
vision in particular, for promoting polarization (e.g.,
Prior 2007; Wilson 2006). A variety of different theories
have been used to suggest that television either helps or
hurts the cause of mutual respect among oppositional
political forces. But the underlying assumption in all
cases is that ideally television should publicly air the
rationales behind opposing sides of a controversy, so
that eventual losers in a given controversy can become
familiar with the reasons or arguments that ultimately
were judged to be stronger. As the most public of all
contexts for political discourse, television could serve
“to ensure that no one could see the end result as ar-
bitrary rather than reasonable and justifiable, even if
not what he or she happened to see as most justifiable”
(Fearon 1998, 62).
In this study, I focus on the unique visual perspec-
tive that television provides on politicians and polit-
ical advocates, and offer a theoretical framework for
understanding how televised political discourse may
serve to either increase or decrease the legitimacy that
partisans grant to oppositional political views. My find-
ings suggest that television certainly has the capacity
to educate viewers about oppositional positions and
to increase the perceived legitimacy of oppositional
views; however, the extremely intimate perspective
that it provides on political disagreement ultimately
undermines its ability to serve these ends.
TELEVISION AS A MEDIUM FOR POLITICAL
DISCOURSE
Television has both advantages and disadvantages as
a source of exposure to oppositional perspectives. On
the one hand, television is less subject to the constraints
of parochialism that plague face-to-face interactions.
The limited potential for accomplishing this end in the
realm of face to face discourse has led many to sug-
gest that for most people, most of the time, exposure
to opposing political perspectives happens via mass
media (Calhoun 1988; Mutz and Martin 2001; Page
1996). Television transcends time and space to reach
large, heterogeneous audiences so that less insular per-
spectives are made more widely available (Meyrowitz
1986). Moreover, television’s propensity to present
controversial material in a point-counterpoint fashion
ensures that at least some opposing perspectives are
heard.
Perhaps in a country as large as the United States,
“We must accept a division of labor: that is, delegate
the jobs of studying policy and addressing the public to
a small set of representative or surrogate deliberators,
perhaps to professional policy experts and communica-
tors” (Page 1996, 4). Page suggests that the only prac-
tical solution is for professional communicators such
as politicians, policy advocates or journalists to act for
and represent the deliberation of ordinary citizens. If
this is the only practical solution, then at least through
television oppositional views can reach citizens
who are third-party observers of others’ conflicting
views.
On the other hand, it is probably naı¨ve to expect
exposure to oppositional views through television to
easily convince partisans that the opposition is worthy.
Watching others discuss opposing perspectives on tele-
vision is qualitatively different from participation in
face-to-face discussion, and even the evidence on face-
to-face deliberation is mixed in what it suggests about
the likelihood of positive outcomes (see Mendelberg
2002). Moreover, many such presentations on televi-
sion are not discussions at all, but rather successive
airings of opposing positions that viewers can passively
watch, but in which they cannot participate.
Mere exposure to alternative perspectives is only
a first step along the road to attributing legitimacy
to opposing views. After viewing the typical point-
counterpoint format of so much televised political dis-
course, do citizens come away with a sense that the
opposition has a legitimate basis for its views, or do
viewers become still more convinced that the opposi-
tion is ill-motivated and/or unjustifiable? Not all tele-
vised political conflict is cut of the same cloth. For this
reason I turn next to variations in televised political dis-
course and the differences these variations may make
to the effectiveness of televised political discourse in
legitimizing oppositional views.
EFFECTS OF “IN-YOUR-FACE”
DISAGREEMENT
Can mass media make up for what Americans lack in
face-to-face exposure to political discourse and thereby
enhance the perceived legitimacy of the political oppo-
sition? There is ample room for skepticism on this point
given the current nature of televised political discourse.
Granting legitimacy to those with whom one has sig-
nificant differences of opinion is a complex and cogni-
tively difficult task (see Gilbert 1991). Two relatively
common characteristics of televised political discourse
may make this potential benefit less likely.
First, much of the political discourse that transpires
on television is highly uncivil in tone. As Wilson (2006,
18) notes, “Once the media talked to us; now they
shout at us.” The usual social norms for politeness
among those expressing differences of political opinion
in face-to-face settings are routinely ignored on televi-
sion (Mutz and Reeves 2005). Production values and
intense market competition put a premium on conflict
and drama. As a result, political advocates may come
across as nasty, boorish sorts, particularly to those who
do not find their views persuasive. Further, incivility
in televised political disagreements has been shown to
decrease trust in government and politicians relative to
equivalent disagreements that transpire more politely
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(Mutz and Reeves 2005). Clearly, there is something
about incivility that rubs Americans the wrong way
(see also Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 2002). But pre-
vious research does not speak to the issue of whether
viewers learn anything from listening to the opposition,
or whether they come away with an enhanced appreci-
ation for the merits of the other side as a result of their
viewing.
What is known about incivility—–whether in political
discourse or some other context—–is that it heightens
levels of arousal (see Geen 1975; Mutz and Reeves
2005). Arousal is closely tied to levels of attention, so
one might expect uncivil political discourse to be espe-
cially well remembered. Indeed, those involved in the
production of political television routinely argue that
lively and passionate debate is a necessary ingredient
for a successful political television program. Anything
less is too boring to attract the attention of television
audiences (see, e.g., Christianson 1986, Bradley et al.
1992, Christianson et al. 1986).
Beyond incivility, televised political discourse is also
unique in the impression of intimacy that it creates.
Few people will ever be physically as close to the public
figures shown in televised political discourse as view-
ers feel themselves to be when watching television.
As television cameras have become smaller, less ob-
trusive, and increasingly powerful due to technological
advances, it has become common to show talking heads
engaged in political repartee from an extremely close
perspective.1 To obtain the same perspective on an-
other person in real life, one would need to be virtually
kissing him or her. In this sense televised political dis-
course can be described as doubly “in your face;” it
is both unusually uncivil relative to everyday conver-
sations, and it also creates the impression that, quite
literally, the political speakers are in your face, that is,
unnaturally and uncomfortably close for a nonintimate
acquaintance and public figure.
The distance between people has important conse-
quences for how a person reacts to another, and this is
particularly true with respect to the physical distance
between two people who do not agree. For example,
in one study individual subjects were shown a mock
survey supposedly filled out by the person the subject
was about to meet. The surveys were rigged to convince
each subject that the confederate’s attitudes were ei-
ther very similar to or highly dissimilar from his or her
own, based on random assignment. Not surprisingly, a
person assumed to be dissimilar in opinions was sys-
tematically less liked than one assumed to be similar.
More interestingly, a second manipulation randomly
assigned subjects to conditions in which the confed-
erate sat unusually close to the subject, or across the
table from him. When the confederate sat abnormally
close to the subject, violating the norms for personal
space, close physical distance interacted with attitude
1 Television cameras were initially so large and heavy that they were
entirely stationary, at times with a fixed focal length. In the head
shots that characterize much of televised political discourse today,
the cameras are zoomed in so close that even portions of the speaker’s
head are routinely cut off and out of frame.
similarity to intensify attitudes toward the confeder-
ate (Middlemist, Knowles, and Matter 1976; see also
Schiffenbauer and Schiavo 1976; Storms and Thomas
1977).
This pattern of reactions to interpersonal dis-
tance has been well documented in the realm of
face-to-face interaction. Dissimilarity breeds dislike,
and closeness generally intensifies whatever kind of
reaction—–positive or negative—–a person has to an-
other person or object. This intensification of affect ap-
pears to be produced by the greater arousal that physi-
cal closeness produces (e.g., Middlemist, Knowles, and
Matter 1976; Smith and Knowles 1979). Higher arousal
levels signal a greater intensity of emotional reaction,
and the valence of the person or object—–whether they
are liked or disliked—–produces the label that is as-
signed to that intensification.
If one extends this same logic to television, it sug-
gests that perhaps less physical distance—–even when
manifested through television cameras as the mere ap-
pearance of greater physical closeness between viewer
and political advocate—–has important consequences
for how people react to the political discourse they
see on television. Filmmakers have long recognized
the potential for facial close-ups to intensify emotional
reactions in the audience. As Russian film director
Sergei Eisenstein (1940/1974) described it, “A cock-
roach filmed in close-up seems on the screen a hun-
dred times more terrible than a hundred elephants
captured in long shot.” The close-up creates a sense of
spatial intimacy that often violates individuals’ bound-
aries for personal space, particularly when close con-
tact with the person on the screen is undesirable. The
conventions of television and film editing purposely
seek to recreate familiar perceptual phenomena. More-
over, many editing devices “acquire . . . meaning by
approximating some feature of real world experience.
In the case of shot tightness being used as an in-
tensifier, the aspect of experience being replicated is
surely the greater involvement that comes with in-
creased proximity to people and objects . . .” (Messaris
1994). Many of the conventions used in television are
based on analogies to real world experiences, so it
should not be surprising that people react similarly to
them.
Empirical evidence has largely corroborated these
observations. For example, a person appearing on
a large-screen television (and thus having the ap-
pearance of being larger and closer to the viewer)
is more likely to invoke a violation of the viewer’s
sense of personal space than one on a smaller screen
(Lombard 1995). Likewise, Reeves and Nass (1996)
find that viewers’ levels of attention and recall respond
to mediated simulations of interpersonal distance (ma-
nipulated through the use of close-ups versus long
shots, and through the size and distance of the image
from the viewer) in much the same way that they do
to interpersonal distance in face-to-face contexts (see
also, Lombard et al. 2000).
Importantly, the sense of threat experienced by tele-
vision viewers is not likely to be a cognitive acknowl-
edgment of some real threat; after all, few people would
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claim they feel imminent danger from a politician on
a television screen. Instead, it is a subconscious feel-
ing of threat based on the perception of being physi-
cally very close to someone who is disagreeable, and
who thus presents an unwelcome invasion of personal
space (Persson 1998). Sullivan and Masters (1987) have
similarly argued that by creating a facsimile of real
world visual experience, the visual element of televi-
sion encourages “gut reactions” on the part of viewers,
emotional reactions that are not mediated by cognitive
assessments.2
IN-YOUR-FACE POLITICS: A THEORETICAL
FRAMEWORK
What does political television’s tendency to violate ev-
eryday norms of civility and personal space imply about
its ability to serve as a source of information about a
legitimate opposition? To the extent that political ad-
vocates of the opposing side create the impression of
being uncomfortably close when featured in televised
discourse, and/or unusually impolite, viewers should
experience higher levels of emotional arousal. Arousal
is, however, a double-edged sword. On one hand, some
level of arousal is absolutely necessary in order to pro-
duce attention to the content of political discourse.3
The arousal produced by “in-your-face” political dis-
course should heighten levels of physiological arousal,
and thus enhance attention to content and promote
greater awareness of oppositional perspectives. View-
ers cannot be expected to learn anything about opposi-
tional perspectives unless they are paying attention. On
the other hand, this same heightened level of arousal
should intensify whatever affect a viewer already holds,
thus producing greater dislike for an already disliked
political advocate. The “in-your-face” perspective on
political discourse that television often provides may
increase viewers’ awareness of oppositional perspec-
tives and candidates, but simultaneously polarize atti-
tudes toward opposing positions.
From a more positive, constructive angle, this theo-
retical framework suggests the conditions under which
televised discourse might improve perceptions of the
perceived legitimacy of the opposition. To the ex-
tent that televised political discourse is able to draw
viewer attention, without intensifying opponents’ al-
ready negative views toward one another, greater op-
positional legitimacy should result. So under what
2 Although their studies focused specifically on the effects of politi-
cians’ nonverbal facial displays on public attitudes, they likewise
suggest that expressive displays have a direct emotional impact on
viewers (see McHugo et al. 1985; Sullivan and Masters 1987).
3 Extremely high levels of emotional arousal can be overwhelming,
and interfere with the encoding of message content (e.g., Loftus
and Burns 1982). Thus the relationship between emotional
arousal and recall is sometimes curvilinear; recall is low at both the
low and the extreme high ends of the arousal spectrum, and highest in
the midrange (e.g., Gilligan and Bower 1984). At the highest arousal
levels, people may remember the main point but are unlikely to recall
details. However, in the case of politics, the range of potential arousal
is likely to be attenuated at the high end, thus making the reactions
characteristic of the extremely high levels of arousal unlikely.
conditions should exposure to televised political dis-
course have positive versus negative or neutral con-
sequences for perceptions of the legitimacy of the
opposition?
Relative to not watching at all, I expect televised
exposure to oppositional perspectives to enhance the
extent to which viewers are aware of oppositional ar-
guments, regardless of the way in which these views
are presented. The logic of this expectation is straight-
forward: no matter how arguments are presented, ex-
posure to political discourse cannot reduce the level
of awareness people have about arguments promoted
by disliked candidates or about the rationales for what
seem to them disagreeable policy positions. Viewers
are likely to become more aware of oppositional per-
spectives from viewing.
But based on related psychological research, the
increased arousal from “in-your-face” discourse also
should intensify the negative affect viewers have for
disliked people and political positions. When politi-
cal advocates promote viewpoints with which a viewer
disagrees, and do so in an “in-your-face” manner (i.e.,
uncivil discourse viewed from an intimate camera per-
spective), such presentations should detract from the
legitimacy that citizen-viewers accord those opposi-
tional perspectives. Just as in the face-to-face psy-
chology experiment described above, non-like-minded
people and policies should be even less well liked
when viewers are forced to experience disagreeable
views from a highly intimate, “in-your-face” perspec-
tive. Likewise, well-liked people and their perspectives
may be even more positively regarded as a result of the
up-close and personal perspective.
Because this theoretical framework involves a com-
plex, multistep process, it is most easily evaluated by
breaking it down into a series of specific hypotheses
that build on one another. The first hypothesis is that
close-up camera perspectives and incivility will both
increase levels of emotional arousal. Mutz and Reeves
(2005) found evidence supportive of this impact from
incivility, but evidence to date on the effects of cam-
era perspective is limited. Because the two additional
hypotheses rest on this first hypothesis, it is crucial to
validate it before examining the anticipated effects that
arousal may have on awareness of oppositional ratio-
nales and their perceived legitimacy.
A second hypothesis following from the first is
that heightened arousal will increase levels of recall.
Thus the same independent variables that increase
arousal—–incivility and close-up camera perspectives—–
also should enhance awareness of oppositional views
that are heard via television. A third and final hypoth-
esis is that close-up camera perspectives will interact
with levels of civility in the same fashion as in the face-
to-face experiment conducted by social psychologists.
Relative to not watching at all, or to a medium camera
perspective, close-up camera perspectives will intensify
viewers’ reactions to opposing political arguments and
candidates. When they are presented in a likeable, civil
fashion, viewers will see those arguments in favor of
the opposition as even more legitimate, whereas view-
ers who witness an uncivil exchange will perceive the
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opposition as having even less legitimate rationales for
their views than they would have otherwise.
RESEARCH DESIGN
For purposes of examining these hypotheses, it was
necessary to manipulate the camera perspective on
the exact same political discourse, as well as to vary
the level of civility expressed while holding all else
constant. Toward that end, televised political discourse
was presented to subjects in a laboratory setting using
three experiments with adult subjects. In order to gain
greater control over rival hypotheses and disentangle
the effects of political substance versus presentation,
the two independent variables were manipulated in-
dependently so that there were four versions of tele-
vised political discourse that differed in (1) whether the
camera perspective suggests greater or lesser personal
space between the viewer and the political advocates,
and (2) the extent of civility/politeness in expressions
of political differences.
In order to create political discourse suitable for
these purposes, professional actors were hired, and a
professional studio talk show set was used to tape an
informal political discussion between what were said to
be two congressional candidates. Subjects were told the
candidates were running for an open congressional seat
in a faraway state. A moderator intervened at times
predetermined by a script and addressed questions to
the two candidates. Participants were simply asked to
watch the program for 20 minutes and were told that
they would be asked some questions about it after it
was over.
The candidates held opposing views on each issue. In
order to present literally the same political content in
the civil and uncivil versions of the debate, the actors
stuck closely to a script.4 In the complete 40-minute
exchange, a total of eight issues were discussed and
debated, but participants were exposed to the discus-
sion of a subset of four of these eight issues in each
experimental study. To ensure that results did not hinge
on any one particular segment of the program, a dif-
ferent subset of the eight discussions was used in each
experiment.5
The candidates expressed exactly the same issue po-
sitions in the same words in both the civil and uncivil
versions of this program, and they offered exactly the
same arguments in support of their positions. The only
4 The script drew on arguments from interest groups that were for
and against eight different issues. All issues had been in the news at
the time of the taping of the mock talk show and remained topical
at the time of the experiments.
5 Experiment 1 involved discussions of restrictions on tobacco ad-
vertising, taxing Internet sales, the repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act
affecting financial industries, and whether candidate qualifications
should include previous public service experience. Experiment 2
incorporated discussions of restrictions on tobacco advertising, free
trade, taxing internet purchases, and on whether previous public
service/political experience is an asset or a liability for a member
of Congress. Experiment 3 utilized discussions of NASA funding,
insurance coverage for mental health, Internet privacy policies, and
free trade.
departures from the script that were allowed for pur-
poses of creating the variance in civility were non-
verbal cues (such as rolling of the eyes) and phrases
devoid of explicit political content (such as “You have
completely missed the point here!”). The candidates
in the uncivil condition also raised their voices and
interrupted one another. In the civil version, the politi-
cians spoke calmly throughout and were patient and
respectful while the other person spoke.
To ensure that these relatively subtle differences
adequately manipulated civility, pretest subjects were
asked to rate the candidates on scales ranging from
quarrelsome to cooperative, friendly to hostile, and
rude to polite. The uncivil versions of the issue ex-
changes were consistently perceived as significantly
less polite, more quarrelsome, and less friendly. As a
manipulation check, respondents in each of the actual
experiments also were asked to rate the candidates on
these same scales. As in the pretest, these items con-
firmed that both candidates were seen as significantly
more hostile and rude in the uncivil conditions than in
the civil ones.
The camera perspective manipulation was made pos-
sible by shooting both the civil and uncivil tapings
using four simultaneous cameras. For each exchange
of opinions, one camera maintained a medium-range
shot of the speaker’s upper body, while another camera
maintained a tight facial close-up of the same person.
Two additional cameras did the same for the other
candidate. The tapes were later edited using the same
conventions as for a typical talk show. After an initial
long shot established the set and the location of the can-
didates and moderator, the subsequent shots were al-
most exclusively tight close-ups in close-up version. In
the medium version, the same event was simply shown
from the perspective of cameras that had backed in
their framing of the participants, and no tight close-ups
of the candidates were included in the medium camera
version. This process produced four different versions
of the same political discourse that were either civil or
uncivil in tone, and that either created the impression
of moderate physical distance between the viewer and
candidates or a close-up “in-your-face” experience of
the same conflict.
Procedures
Procedures were roughly the same in all experiments.
Participants were recruited through temporary em-
ployment agencies and community groups and either
the group treasury or the participants were compen-
sated for their time.6 After consent was obtained, sub-
jects sat on a couch in front of a television screen and
filled out a pretest questionnaire. They then viewed
6 Subjects from temporary employment agencies were compensated
at the hourly rate they had previously agreed on with the agency.
Participants from civic groups participated as a fund-raising activity
for their organizations. Their hourly rates varied based on whether
they were coming to campus to participate in strictly this particular
study, or a series of studies over several hours.
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a segment of the program involving four of the eight
issue exchanges. A paper and pencil questionnaire was
administered after viewing.
The first experiment was designed to determine
whether camera perspective and televised incivility
produce reactions similar to what physical distance
and disagreement produce when experienced in per-
son. Toward that end, Experiment 1 utilized a powerful
Latin-square design and a small sample of 16 subjects,
each of whom experienced all four possible conditions
formed by crossing incivility/civility and close/medium
camera distance. By using four different video seg-
ments, each focused on discussion of a different issue
controversy, it was possible for the each respondent to
view all four possible treatment combinations, without
viewing the same content in more than one condition.
The assignment of issue controversies to conditions was
random for each respondent, as was the order of their
presentation.
The Latin-square design is particularly advantageous
for studying arousal because individual differences
in arousability tend to be quite large, thus making
the within-group variance extremely large. The Latin-
square design allows comparisons of each subject to
their own mean level of arousal across the four con-
ditions, and thus enabled greater statistical power in
examining whether viewers’ levels of arousal varied
systematically due to close-ups and incivility. Given
that four different video segments were used, the re-
sults are also unlikely to depend on the peculiarities of
any individual presentation.
Arousal was measured using skin conductance lev-
els (SCL) assessed by attaching two electrodes to the
palm of each subject’s nondominant hand while he
or she watched the videotapes. Skin conductance is
one indicator of sympathetic activation (Hopkins and
Fletcher 1994), and has been widely used in studies
investigating emotional responses to media (see Lang
2000; or Reeves and Nass 1996, for examples). Data
collection began at the start of each presentation, with
a 10-second period of baseline data recorded while
the screen was blank prior to the start of each debate
segment. The intensity of emotional reactions to these
stimuli forms the theoretical basis for the subsequent
effects. However, given that all subjects were in all of
the four conditions, the within-subject design of Ex-
periment 1 did not allow assessments of the effects
of these manipulations on the perceived legitimacy of
oppositional views.
To address that question, Experiment 2 utilized a
large sample of 155 participants who were exposed
to only one of the four possible experimental condi-
tions formed by crossing civility/incivility with close-up
versus medium camera perspective. Participants were
randomly assigned to watch 20 minutes of televised
political discourse that covered four different issue
disagreements. This between-subject design facilitated
the use of post-test measures of recall and of the legit-
imacy accorded to the other side. In addition, Experi-
ment 2 included a control group in order to determine
whether citizens’ perceptions of the legitimacy of the
opposition benefit from, or are harmed by, televised
political discourse relative to not watching at all. The
participants randomly assigned to the control group
watched a nonpolitical program for the same amount
of time that the treatment groups watched the issue
debates.7
Dependent Variables
Three main concepts were measured in this study.
Arousal was tapped using the SCL data described ear-
lier, which was sampled from subjects every 10 mil-
liseconds, and then averaged for each subject within
each experimental condition.8 Awareness of rationales
for oppositional positions was measured using open-
ended recall measures in the post-tests, which asked
respondents to write down all arguments they could re-
member the candidates having made in support of, or in
opposition to, a given issue position. Respondents were
asked, “What are some of the reasons people are in
support of [stated position]? Please write as many
reasons as you can think of in the box below.” The
goal was to assess the extent to which respondents’
recall of rationales for their own and the oppos-
ing viewpoint was affected by the experimental ma-
nipulations. For each respondent, separate measures
were created corresponding to recall of arguments
on the side he or she supported or opposed based
on the pretest; in other words, the number of legit-
imate arguments respondents could generate for the
“other” side, as well as for their own.9 Although sim-
ple recall of oppositional arguments is not the same
thing as granting legitimacy to oppositional views,
having some awareness of arguments on the other
side is an important prerequisite to granting them
legitimacy.
A third concept, Perceptions of the legitimacy of the
opposition, was operationalized in two ways. First, I
assessed people’s feelings toward the politicians they
most and least favored in order to get a sense of
whether the size of the gap between the preferred and
the nonpreferred candidate was affected by the exper-
imental manipulations. When people retain a degree
of respect for the opposing candidate, this supports the
notion of a legitimate opposition and works against
the potential for polarization. This measure was based
on the difference between the subjects’ feeling ther-
mometer ratings of the two candidates. For a political
process to create legitimacy, it must foster preferences
for one candidate without demonizing the opposition.
Thus the attitudes people hold toward their nonoptimal
7 The control presentation was an instructional video entitled Free
Throw Secrets, in which Dr. Tom Amberry, the “world’s best free
throw shooter,” shares his methods.
8 For each subject, separate time series were created that normalized
individual SCL data relative to baseline recordings. This was done
because baseline SCL varies considerably across people, and because
the major analysis interest is in changes in SCL relative to an ini-
tial state. After within-subject normalization, data were aggregated
across subjects and issues to produce separate time series for the four
conditions in the experiment.
9 These responses were coded by two independent coders, producing
a reliability of .90 for the number of unique arguments generated.
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FIGURE 1. Emotional Arousal by Civility and Camera Perspective (Experiment 1)
-22
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Civil Close-Up Civil Medium Uncivil Close-Up Uncivil Medium
Note: Dependent variable was measured using skin conductance. A repeated measures analysis of variance indicated that uncivil
discourse was significantly more arousing to viewers than a civil version of the same political discussion (t = 14.38; df = 1,299;
p < .001). The close-up camera perspectives was significantly more arousing to viewers than the same event shown using a medium
camera perspective (t = 28.90; df = 1,299; p < .001).
candidates also matter because some portion of the
time they can expect their government leaders to be
other than their preferred candidates (see Bowler and
Donovan 2003). Given that people react negatively to
those with whom they disagree, this theory predicts
that they should react particularly negatively toward
candidates they do not like when those people violate
norms for civility and distance.
A second measure of the perceived legitimacy of the
opposition involved a series of closed-ended questions
assessing respondents’ perceptions of the legitimacy
of the two candidates’ arguments. After completing
the open-ended portion of the post-test questionnaire,
participants were asked to judge the general strengths
and weaknesses of a list of arguments, regardless of
the respondents’ own personal views on the issue. For
each of the four issue segments they viewed, the closed-
ended items listed six of the arguments that were fea-
tured in the program (three made by each candidate).
Subjects were then asked to label each argument as a
“Very strong argument, somewhat strong argument, a
somewhat weak argument, or a very weak argument.”
Although people naturally rate the arguments in sup-
port of their own side of an issue as stronger than those
on the other side; the key question is whether in your
face politics alters the level of legitimacy accorded to
the opposition. These items were used to create indexes
indicating respondents’ assessments of the legitimacy
of arguments made on behalf of the issue positions
they themselves favor, as well as the legitimacy of argu-
ments on the opposing side. The scales used to tap these
dependent variables all achieved respectable levels of
reliability (see Appendix A).
RESULTS
Experiment 1
To what extent does “in-your-face” political discourse
increase viewers’ levels of emotional arousal? Figure 1
shows the average skin conductance level for each of
the four experimental conditions in the Latin square
design. Consistent with expectations, there were clear
differences between conditions for both experimental
factors. Uncivil public discourse was significantly more
arousing than civil versions of the same discussions
(t = 14.38; df = 1,299; p < .001). The analysis of differ-
ent camera perspectives likewise confirmed that close-
ups of the exact same events were significantly more
arousing to viewers than the same event shown using
medium shots (t = 28.90; df = 1,299; p < .001).
As anticipated, uncivil exchanges of political views
featuring tight close-ups were most arousing of all, and
highly civil exchanges shown through medium shots
were least arousing. Given that politics is not a highly
arousing topic for most people, these differences may
well explain why audiences are willing to watch so-
called “shout shows” on television. Mutz and Reeves
(2005) reported a puzzling finding suggesting that peo-
ple reported a greater intent to watch uncivil programs
than civil ones, yet the same people appeared to judge
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FIGURE 2. Effects of Civility and Camera Perspective on Awareness of Arguments for Own and
Opposing Issue Positions (Experiment 2)
Note: Based on a two-by-two analysis of variance, the interaction of incivility and close-up camera perspective was significant for
awareness of arguments for opposing issue position (F = 4.36, p < .05). For awareness of arguments on one’s own side, only incivility
significantly enhanced recall (F = 5.13, p < .05). All planned contrasts between each of the experimental groups relative to the control
condition were significant (p < .05).
the uncivil politicians quite negatively after viewing.
People may genuinely dislike the behavior they ob-
serve, and judge the participants negatively as a result,
but they are clearly very arousing to watch, and all the
more so when disagreement is of the “in-your-face”
variety. Given their highly arousing content, atten-
tion levels to such programs are naturally quite high,
whether they like them or not. But it remains to be
seen whether these differential levels of arousal have
implications for the processing of televised political
discourse. Arousal is widely accepted as an indicator
of attention, but it reveals nothing about what people
learn from the content, nor the valence of people’s re-
actions to what they learn. For these purposes, a second
experiment was required.
Experiment 2
For the second study, a much larger number of partic-
ipants was recruited in order to facilitate a five condi-
tion between-subjects design. With each subject in only
one condition, it was possible to assess the effects of
the independent variables on recall of issue arguments
for own and opposing issue perspectives, as well as
for effects on the legitimacy of those same arguments.
Results were examined using an analysis of variance
with planned contrasts between the experimental con-
ditions and the control group, and a two-by-two full
factorial analysis of variance.
Awareness of Rationales for Own
and Opposing Issue Positions
Figure 2 shows the extent of awareness of arguments
supporting one’s own issue positions on the right and
of others’ issue positions on the left. As shown in Fig-
ure 2, regardless of whether one considers recall of
arguments supporting own or others’ issue positions,
the patterns are virtually identical. Recall of arguments
was enhanced by the same factors that enhance arousal:
incivility and a close-up camera perspective. For aware-
ness of oppositional issue arguments, the interaction of
incivility and close-up camera perspective was signifi-
cant (F = 4.36, p < .05). For awareness of arguments
on one’s own side, only incivility significantly enhanced
recall (F = 5.13, p < .05), though the pattern is very
similar to the left-hand side of Figure 2. The uncivil,
close-up conditions consistently stand out in producing
higher levels of recall.
Focusing next on comparisons with the control con-
ditions in the center of the left and right panels, there is
clear evidence that viewers learned something about
the issue controversies from watching the program,
regardless of version. Analysis of variance results sug-
gest that awareness of issue arguments on one’s own
side is improved by watching the experimental ver-
sions of the program, regardless of whether viewers
watched civil or uncivil, close-up or medium versions.
The same was true for awareness of issue arguments
for the oppositional view. Those who watched the
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FIGURE 3. Effects of Civility and Camera Perspective on Difference Between Thermometer Rating
of Preferred and Oppositional Candidate (Experiment 2)
Note: Two-factor analysis of variance indicated a significant interaction between civility and camera perspective (F = 4.84, p < .05).
political program knew consistently more than those
who did not. All planned contrasts between each of
these groups relative to the control condition were sig-
nificant (p < .05).
On one hand, this finding is simply consistent with
previous evidence of television’s capacity to inform the
electorate; people learned something from watching
(e.g., Baum 2003). But more specifically, it supports the
notion that television may play an important role in ed-
ucating the public on the views of people outside their
immediate environments, and on the arguments these
others use to support those oppositional positions.
Attitudes toward the Opposition
The findings thus far on both arousal and recall/
awareness of oppositional views are basically support-
ive of the idea that televised public discourse may play
an important role in making people aware of oppo-
sitional issue perspectives, and possibly in legitimiz-
ing oppositional political perspectives as well. How
might one know that the opposition was seen as more
legitimate as a result of viewing political discourse?
Although political preferences themselves would not
change, one can imagine that effective exposure to
oppositional views should produce less villainization
of the opposing side. Thus as a first test of this hy-
pothesis, I examined the gap between viewer attitudes
toward their preferred candidate and the alternative
candidate. There is no significant pattern of attitudes
toward the two individual politicians based on whether
subjects viewed civil or uncivil, close-up or medium
versions of the stimuli. However, as shown in Figure 3,
differences in the thermometer ratings between the
preferred and nonpreferred candidate confirmed the
hypothesized pattern specifically when subjects were
shown the close-up version of political discourse. When
the uncivil candidates were shown in close-ups, the gap
between evaluations of the two candidates was exac-
erbated, just as close-up disagreement from another
live human being intensified attitudes in the laboratory.
However, the very same means for subjects watching
the exact same event from a medium camera perspec-
tive did not differ. Consistent with appearances, these
findings produced an interaction between civility and
camera distance (F = 4.84, p < .05).
In short, levels of candidate civility made a big dif-
ference when shown to viewers in an up-close and per-
sonal manner, but no difference at all from a more
distant perspective. Interestingly, the findings in Fig-
ure 3 are driven primarily by differences in the evalu-
ations of the least-liked candidates. Attitudes toward
the preferred candidate did not vary significantly by
condition. The greater gap between evaluations of the
preferred candidate and his opposition is driven by at-
titudes toward the opposition. Regardless, this pattern
is indicative of the same kind of polarization that con-
cerns many observers of American politics (see, e.g.,
Jacobson 2007). It is troubling when the opposition is
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so much less liked than the preferred candidate, but
as often as not, citizens will need to live under the
government of someone who was not their choice.
The Perceived Legitimacy of Opposing
Arguments
Relative to the control group, the people who watched
televised political discourse came away from the expe-
rience better able to recount the other side’s arguments
as well as their own. One would hope that this result
translates into a sense that theirs is not the only legiti-
mate way to think about the political world. But open-
ended recall is clearly not the same as perceiving those
oppositional arguments to be legitimate ones. For this
purpose, I compared means for the direct assessments
of the perceived legitimacy of arguments made on both
sides.
There were no significant differences by experimen-
tal condition in analyses examining the perceived le-
gitimacy of arguments supporting one’s own views.
Regardless of whether political discourse was viewed
from a close or medium perspective, and regardless of
whether the political advocates were civil or uncivil,
respondents viewed the arguments on their own side
of these issues as just as legitimate. This result parallels
the finding for attitudes toward most and least-liked
candidates. The manipulations had no discernible ef-
fect on what respondents knew they liked.
However, as with the findings on liking for candi-
dates, the manipulations had a significant impact on
perceptions of the value of the “other side.” As shown
in Figure 4, the four conditions within the two-by-two
factorial design produced a significant interaction be-
tween civility and camera distance (F = 6.41, p < .05).
Levels of civility mattered a great deal to perceptions
of the legitimacy of opposition views when subjects
viewed the uncivil exchange in one of the close-up
conditions. This interaction demonstrates that when
viewed up close and personal, people found the very
same arguments espoused in the civil version of the
debate more legitimate than those in the uncivil one.
If viewed from a medium camera perspective, civility
made no difference.
The presence of the control condition shown in the
center of Figure 4 also makes it possible to assess
whether watching this program helped or hurt the
perceived legitimacy of arguments on the other side
relative to not watching at all. Planned comparisons
suggest that the mean in the control condition is sta-
tistically indistinguishable from the means for both of
the medium conditions on the right hand side of Fig-
ure 4. But on the left-hand side of Figure 4, the mean
of the close-up, uncivil condition shows significantly
less perceived legitimacy than the control condition,
and the mean for the close-up, civil condition indicates
significantly greater perceived legitimacy relative to the
control condition (omnibus F = 7.10, p < .01; contrast
FIGURE 4. Effects of Civility and Camera Perspective on the Perceived Legitimacy of Opposing
Arguments (Experiment 2)
Note: A two-by-two factorial design (omitting control) produced a significant interaction between civility and camera distance (F = 6.41,
p < .05). Planned comparisons demonstrated that the mean in the control condition was statistically indistinguishable from the means
for both of the medium conditions on the right-hand side of Figure 4. But on the left-hand side of Figure 4, the mean of the close-up,
uncivil condition indicated significantly less perceived legitimacy than the control condition, and the mean for the close-up, civil condition
indicates significantly greater perceived legitimacy relative to the control condition (omnibus F = 7.10, p < .01; contrast between civil
and control, p < .01, contrast between uncivil and control, p < .001).
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between civil and control, p < .01, contrast between
uncivil and control, p < .001).
These contrasts make it possible to draw conclusions
about the effects of viewing different styles of televised
political discourse relative to not watching at all. Even
though subjects in the close-up and medium conditions
were viewing precisely the same exchange, the per-
ceived proximity of the politicians led to less favorable
evaluations of the disagreeable issue arguments in the
uncivil exchange, and more favorable evaluations in the
civil one. These results nicely mirror previous findings
on the intensifying effect of physical proximity in face-
to-face situations. When disagreeable issue positions
are espoused by a civil person in close-up, they are
viewed as more legitimate than they otherwise would
be. When disagreeable positions are espoused by an
uncivil person, they are viewed as less legitimate than
they otherwise would be.
To summarize the results of Experiment 2, these
findings suggest that television political discourse does
have the capacity to improve citizens’ awareness of
oppositional views, and the extent to which opposi-
tion is perceived as having a legitimate basis for their
views. But “in-your-face” politics is, indeed, a double-
edged sword. The intimacy of the television camera
can enhance the perceived legitimacy of oppositional
views when they are presented in a civil manner. When
they are presented in an uncivil manner, that same
intimacy convinces people that the opposition is even
less legitimate than they would have thought without
any viewing.
Thus far these findings are limited to results from one
small and one large experiment. To assess the general-
izability of these findings to other populations and issue
conflicts, a third experiment was conducted with a com-
pletely different set of videotaped issue discussions.
Experiment 3 was designed to replicate the important
findings in Experiment 2. To reduce the number of
subjects required, participants were randomly exposed
to one of only two conditions this time, either close-up
versions of civil discourse or close-up versions of uncivil
discourse. Given that these were the two conditions
that produced significant differences from the control
condition in Experiment 2, a similar pattern of results
in Experiment 3 would lend greater confidence in these
findings.
Figure 5 analyzes the results of Experiment 3 to
see whether subjects in the uncivil/close-up condition
systematically evaluated their least-favored candidate
more poorly than subjects in the civil/close-up condi-
tion, as was the case in Experiment 2. As illustrated,
there was no difference in feelings toward the candi-
date each subject liked the most as a result of viewing
them behaving in an uncivil manner. However, the op-
position is systematically judged more negatively in the
uncivil condition relative to the civil one. As a result,
just as in Experiment 2, the gap between the favored
and the nonfavored candidate is far larger after view-
ing uncivil political discourse. Uncivil behavior on the
part of one’s own side is dismissed as mere righteous
indignation in the face of an uncivil opponent; when
the other side engages in similar behavior, it is a sign of
FIGURE 5. Effects of Close-Up/Incivility on Thermometer Rating of Preferred and Oppositional
Candidate (Experiment 3)
Note: Analysis of variance indicated no significant difference between civil and uncivil conditions for the most favored candidate
(F = .21, p = .65), but a significant difference between conditions for the least favored candidate (F = 6.17, p < .01). The size of the
gap between individuals’ evaluations of their least- and most-favored candidates also was significantly different by condition (F = 5.14,
p < .05).
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TABLE 1. Effects of Civility on the Perceived Legitimacy of
Rationales Supporting Own and Opposing Issue Positions
Legitimacy of Arguments Supporting
Own Issue Position Other Issue Position
Civil (0)/Uncivil (1) −.17 (.52) −.69∗ (2.02)
Perceived Legitimacy of Arguments for —– .40∗∗ (2.96)
Own Issue Position
Perceived Legitimacy of Arguments for .33∗∗ (2.96) —–
Other Issue Position
Strength of Partisanship .04 (.16) .45 (1.89)
Political Interest .03 (.15) −.05 (.24)
Education −.06 (.44) −.28 (1.81)
Sex −.22 (.67) .63 (1.79)
Age −.01 (.29) −.06∗ (2.51)
Income .02 (.28) −.19∗ (2.48)
R2 .23 .45
Note: Entries are OLS regression coefficients with t-values in parentheses. Dependent variables
represent the sum of the mean strength of argument scores for each of the four issues dis-
cussed, broken down by arguments supporting the respondent’s own issue positions, and those
supporting the opposing position.
their depravity. Interestingly, precisely this same kind
of data on gaps between evaluations of one’s own side
and the opposition is cited in historical context to argue
that polarization has increased in the United States (see
Jacobson 2007).
In Table 1, I use data from the legitimacy items in
Experiment 3 to examine the closely related hypothesis
for issues, rather than for candidates. Does exposure
to close-up, uncivil discourse reduce the legitimacy
attributed to oppositional arguments? The results in
Table 1 illustrate basically the same pattern of results
as in Figure 2. Using a regression equation that controls
for a variety of demographic characteristics as well as
for general awareness of the rationales for these issue
positions, Table 1 suggests that incivility has no effects
on the number of rationales people recall for their own
side of these controversies.10 However, as shown in the
right column, incivility has a significant negative im-
pact on awareness of rationales for oppositional views.
As in Figure 5, this pattern of results means that the
balance of arguments and justifications that a person
takes away from viewing televised political discourse
are even more imbalanced as a result of “in-your-face”
exposure to political discourse.
DISCUSSION: REMEMBERING MORE
AND LIKING IT LESS
Consistent with previous research, people do appear
to learn from political television, and this includes
learning about why others hold the opinions that they
do. Subjects recalled significantly more rationales for
oppositional views as a result of viewing even highly
uncivil political discourse. For those citizens who find
it difficult to fathom how others might reasonably hold
10 As shown Table 1, demographic variables made little difference
to perceived legitimacy, and the same was true for the analyses in
Figures 2 through 5. Including covariates in the analyses of variance
did not change any of the key results.
views other than their own (an increasingly sizable
group according to many sources), televised political
discourse is undoubtedly serving an important pur-
pose. The vicarious experience of political deliberation
is bringing new arguments and perspectives to public
attention.
These effects are encouraged by the kind of lively
repartee that often characterizes today’s political pro-
grams. Close-up perspectives on uncivil exchanges of
political views are arousing for viewers to watch, and
thus help to draw audiences to these programs, as well
as to encourage attention and retention while viewing.
To be sure, levels of attention are likely to be abnor-
mally high in a laboratory setting, so the levels of recall
reported here would probably be less impressive in real
world viewing settings. On the other hand, civil and
uncivil political programs would probably not draw
equally sized audiences in the real world either; un-
civil programs would draw larger audiences and thus
have the potential to educate more viewers about op-
positional views. Generalizability issues could thus cut
both ways when projecting these findings to real world
contexts.
When seen exclusively from this perspective, tele-
vised political discourse would seem to be in the service
of a deliberative body politic. People may not be con-
versing with friends or neighbors who hold opposing
views, but at least they hear about them on televi-
sion. As the control group comparisons suggest, any
exposure is better than nothing at all when it comes to
what people know about why the political opposition
feels the way they do. If incivility draws more interest
and attention, so much the better based on this evi-
dence alone.
But the problem inherent in this prescription be-
comes apparent when the analysis turns to effects on
people’s evaluations of those same candidates and their
issue arguments. Incivility alone does not dampen en-
thusiasm for political advocates nor the arguments they
make. However, when uncivil discourse and close-up
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camera perspectives combine to produce the unique
“in-your-face” perspective, then the high levels of
arousal and attention come at the cost of lowering re-
gard for the other side. The “in-your-face” intimacy of
uncivil political discourse on television discourages the
kind of mutual respect that might sustain perceptions
of a legitimate opposition. Here the pattern of findings
is quite consistent; close-up perspectives on uncivil dis-
course routinely damage perceptions of the candidates
and issue arguments that subjects are already prone to
dislike; that is, attitudes toward the least-liked candi-
date, and the perceived legitimacy of rationales for op-
posing issue positions. The same pattern of effects did
not occur for attitudes toward the preferred candidate,
nor for perceptions of the legitimacy of arguments for
the preferred issue position. In other words, by violat-
ing social norms, the political advocates increased the
intensity of affect among the opposition, but remain-
ing civil did not intensify the positive feelings viewers
held toward their own side. Instead, on television as
in everyday life, civility appears to be the default ex-
pectation, and it is arousing and influential only when
people deviate from it. Nonetheless, the overall effect
of these two patterns was to increase the magnitude of
the difference that is perceived between one’s own side
and the opposition.
From one perspective, this pattern might call for
downplaying the real-world significance of these ef-
fects; after all, what difference does it make if people
have even greater dislike for candidates or ideas that
they are already inclined to oppose? But the implica-
tions are important because of the need for people to
be aware of, and hold some degree of respect for, peo-
ple and views other than their most preferred choices.
In short, these differences matter for the legitimacy
of any multiparty, pluralist system. A willingness to
acknowledge that there is something to be said for the
other side, even when one’s own views do not prevail, is
essential to the kind of legitimacy that allows a demo-
cratic political system to remain stable.11
Whether citizens have become increasingly extreme
in their own policy preferences or not (see Nivola and
Brady 2006, for a full discussion), these results suggest
one mechanism by which citizens come to perceive that
the opposition is unworthy and illegitimate. When those
holding differing views violate social norms by being
uncivil and disagreeable right in viewers’ faces, it is
all that much easier to demonize them along multiple
dimensions. To recall the question Dave Barry posed
before the introduction of this article, for viewers of
“in-your-face” political discourse, one would have to
answer with a resounding “Yes.”
On the one hand, up-close incivility and opposition
on television is processed as threatening information
that is worthy of attention, and viewers tend to learn
11 Although many understandings of the concept of legitimacy are
possible, the term is used here to suggest that a person has heard the
other side and granted it some degree of reasonableness as an oppo-
sitional viewpoint, despite continued disagreement. If one attributes
evil, undesirable motives as the basis of explanation for another’s
views, or has no comprehension of the opponent’s basis for differing
views, then one does not perceive the opposition as legitimate.
something from it. This aspect of the findings counters
the traditional notion that viewers will somehow selec-
tively attend to only agreeable content (cf. Campbell
et al. 1960). On the other hand, the evidence is entirely
consistent with the notion that viewers selectively per-
ceive what they are viewing. The perceived legitimacy
of one’s own side of a controversy is unharmed by
incivility even when it is of the “in-your-face” variety.
It is seen as entirely justifiable, whereas the opposi-
tion’s same norm-violating behavior is judged far more
harshly. Thus even if levels of exposure and attention
to the content were identical, one would not expect the
opposing sides of a controversy to respond to the same
televised event in the same fashion.
These results also hint at possible historical changes
in the way citizens respond to candidates and politi-
cal advocates in an age of televisual politics. Although
there is widespread agreement among political pundits
that television has changed American politics in some
fundamental way, scholars have been hard-pressed to
figure out and document exactly how television is dif-
ferent from other media in its political content or
implications (see e.g., Schudson 1995). Early content
analyses showed that television’s political content was
basically the same as that of lead pieces in newspa-
pers, thus challenging the view that television had fun-
damentally changed political media. Likewise, there
continues to be no compelling evidence that television
is consistently more powerful in persuading viewers
than print media. But the content of television is more
than merely the words spoken. When viewers develop
a sense of intimacy with public figures whom they have
never met, and with whom they may have emphatic
disagreements, strong emotions are not surprising. Vi-
sual intimacy and the arousal it brings with it serve to
intensify preexisting feelings. Thus one of the legacies
of political television may be to damage the notion
of a “worthy opposition.” To the extent that televised
political discourse puts viewers unnaturally close to
their political “enemies,” it intensifies negative feelings
about the opposition, and does not serve the goals of
consensus or compromise.
Seeing politicians argue about their disagreeable
policies up-close and personal rather than from a dis-
tance intensifies citizens’ negativity toward those peo-
ple and ideas that they dislike. In the days when such
intimate perspectives were not technologically possi-
ble, as when exposure to politicians was limited to
newspapers, or when extreme close-ups of candidates
were technologically difficult, the intensity of disgust
that people had for those of opposing views might have
remained more muted. In the political realm, television
may be a primary engine of what Sennett (1977) has
termed “the fall of public man.” When private relation-
ships become indistinguishable from public ones, and
public figures and politicians are routinely talking to
people up-close and personal as they sit in their living
rooms, then a boundary is crossed that makes our judg-
ments of them far less impersonal. According to Sen-
nett, the contemporary United States is overwhelmed
by a “tyranny of intimacy,” meaning that private indi-
viduals feel they know public figures in intimate terms.
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Although Sennett’s argument is not about television
per se, it seems likely that the way people “meet” and
experience public figures today is very different from
how they were learned about and encountered in a
pre-television era.
These findings also validate the important role that
emotion plays in understanding the processing of po-
litical television. The effects observed in these studies
depend on gut-level affective reactions. As anyone who
has been cornered by a disagreeable individual at a
cocktail party knows, this experience tends to be un-
pleasant at best. The natural reaction for most people
is to want such individuals out of their faces as soon
as possible. It is one thing if the person is espousing
his or her disagreeable views on the other side of the
room, and quite another if they insist on doing so at
close range. So although television can carry the same
information as any other medium, the emotional im-
pact of televised political discourse is quite different
from what one would expect from a print source, and
different as well from television that frames public fig-
ures from more of a distance. Television replicates the
sound and sight of human experience so that today’s
political advocates can, for better or worse, truly be in
our faces.
APPENDIX A: CONSTRUCTION
AND RELIABILITY OF INDICES
Feeling Thermometers:
“Using our “Feeling Thermometer,” where 0 means you feel
extremely cold toward the candidate and 100 means you feel
extremely warm toward him, how do you feel about [Candi-
date Name] based on viewing the talk show?”
“Using the same feeling thermometer, how do you feel about
[Candidate Name] based on viewing the talk show?”
Perceived Legitimacy of Arguments
“Regardless of your own view on this issue, we would like
you to tell us how strong or weak an argument you think each
of the following reasons is.” All arguments listed were drawn
directly from the statements made by the candidates. Three
examples of the 24 items used for these purposes in each ex-
periment include (for the issue of further regulating tobacco
advertising): “The government has a legitimate interest in
reducing smoking because it costs the healthcare system a
huge amount of money every year.” A 4-point scale ranged
from “very strong argument” (3) to “very weak argument”
(0). “Cigarettes are legal, so the government should not regu-
late them more harshly than other products such as alcohol”
(same scale as above). “Banning tobacco advertising violates
the principle of free speech” (same scale).
Six separate reasons were listed for each issue: three in
support of one side and three in support of the other side.
The average strength ratings for items on one’s own side of
the issue were combined across the four issues, and the same
was done for arguments supporting the side opposite the
respondent’s own view. Thus perceived legitimacy was based
on 12 items for own side and another 12 items for the other
side. Pretest issue opinion questions were used as the basis
for deciding what subjects’ preferences were for each issue.
If a subject had no view on any given issue, then Own and
Other Side were randomly assigned.
Awareness of Arguments
“What are some of the reasons [Candidate Name] gave in
support of his opinion on the talk show? Please write as
many as you can think of in the box below.” Coded for total
number of arguments correctly recalled on Own and Other
Side of issue.
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